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While, at the very least, one could attribute an academic connection between Goethe and 
Wittgenstein to the existence of a common Germanic scientific, literary, and philosophical 
tradition, the following paper attempts to lay the foundation for the possible mapping of the 
methodological and philosophical connections between the two thinkers in hopes to better 
understand Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. I focus on mapping explicit methodological 
connections between the two thinkers, using, on one hand Wittgenstein’s writings and personal 
notes, and, on the other, Goethe’s particular conception of organically-modeled explanations of 
phenomena. Specifically, I argue that Goethe’s method and philosophy of science directly 
influenced Wittgenstein’s work in epistemology and the philosophy of language. This paper, 
therefore, examines Wittgenstein’s language games through a Goethian methodological 
framework, one which bares striking resemblance to the language games of the Philosophical 
Investigations. Goethe postulated all plants to be connected via a universal archetypical plant. To 
Goethe, this plant was the conceptual and developmental basis for all other plants, which, he 
argued, were all possible stages of an infinite field of developmentally-linked possible floral 
forms. Nature, to Goethe, was continuously changing, adapting and interconnected; the 
archetypical plant stood as Goethe’s answer to the causally-focused models of the rapidly 
expanding Newtonian tradition of scientific explanation. Wittgenstein’s work is often split 
between a more static conception of the first half of Wittgenstein’s career, which was built upon 
explanations based upon strict, unchanging rules of logic and corresponding explanations, on one 
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hand, and a more mystical, use-centered approach to philosophical method. This later work is 
often understood to be a substantial revision to its earlier counterpart. My paper argues the later 
Wittgenstein was reacting to methods of philosophical explanation similar to the scientific 
ideology and method of Newton with which Goethe was also reacting, namely closed causal-
focused systems of scientific and philosophical explanation. This argument is augmented by the 
argued methodological connection between Goethe’s archetypical plant and Wittgenstein’s 
language games. By focusing on this Goethian connection, believe scholarship on language 
games, and the later Wittgenstein in general, will be able to be understood from a new 
philosophical vantage point.  
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We have got on to slippery ice where there is no friction, and so, in a certain sense, the 
conditions are ideal; but also, just because of that, we are unable to walk. We want to walk: 
so we need friction. Back to the rough ground! 
 
      -Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
Wittgenstein’s intended function and proper definition of language-games is presented in 
a notoriously vague style. In the following paper, I will examine the ideas of Wittgenstein’s later 
philosophy as a reaction to the ideas that Wittgenstein originally presented in his early work. 
Furthermore, I will argue that what Wittgenstein intends his language games to do, first and 
foremost, is to catalyze a radical shift in the perspective within the reader. This shift in 
perspective, I argue, is a shift from an attempt to define words and concepts based upon a strict 
rules of logic and analysis toward, instead, an attempt to understand instances of word usage in a 
variety of similar, but still distinct, ways. This method is, I argue, concerned with presenting 
language, and indeed, scientific understanding of phenomena, as best understood through 
investigation of organic development from a field of possibilities rather than in terms of an 
event’s causal nexus. Examining language games in light of Wittgenstein’s earlier ideas allows 
the reader to avoid traps that Wittgenstein himself fell victim to in his earlier work, while, at the 
same time, allowing the reader to understand language games in their overall context within the 
history of philosophy. While this context will place the reader in a better position to understand 
why Wittgenstein is employing language games in his later work, there still lie inherent issues in 
successfully determining what exactly constitutes a language game, as well as the proper role 
that language games play in Wittgenstein’s overall philosophy.  
To resolve these concerns, I argue that it is necessary for readers to shift their own focus 
from the mentioned attempt to isolate and characterize language games and their function, to, 
instead, understanding language games in terms of their methodology. To truly understand what 
language games are we must trace their underlying philosophical method back to their origins, 
namely, to the scientific and philosophical methods that influenced the later Wittgenstein’s 
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philosophical approach. The reason for our discussion, then, would be the following; if it were 
possible, to trace methodological influence back in an attempt to find an investigative method 
analogous to Wittgenstein’s, it would also be possible to better understand language games, 
providing even more perspective from which to attempt to resolve the ambiguities accompanying 
language games within the text.  
To facilitate this shift in focus and methodological approach I will use the scientific 
methods and ideas of Goethe – namely Goethe’s conception of understanding phenomena in 
terms of organic growth and variations - to shed light as to what, exactly, language games are 
meant to accomplish within Wittgenstein’s work. Goethe, and the German Romantic movement 
as a whole, like Wittgenstein, sought to catalyze a fundamental shift of perspective within the 
reader in terms of scientific and philosophical thought by replacing a Newtonian, causally-
focused method of investigating and understanding phenomena to a uniquely Romantic approach 
to science. This Romantic approach gave rise to explanations based on understanding 
phenomena in terms of possible organic growth rather than strict causal chains; chains able to be 
standardized, repeated, and quantified – not to mention strictly defined. Addressing the 
possibility of language games existing as a vital diagnostic tool intended to debunk linguistic 
difficulties - as well as demonstrating language as an organically developing structure of possible 
variations of similar but distinct case-specific rules of use - will work to dispel many in-vogue 
ideas portraying the later Wittgenstein to be engaging in a primarily therapeutic form of 
philosophy rather than a diagnostic project resulting in a positive philosophical agenda.  
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2.0  SCIENCE AS AN INFERTIAL FRAMEWORK: ALTERNATIVES TO 
CAUSALLY-FOCUSED EXPLANITORY MODELS 
The link between Goethian science and the later Wittgenstein, on a general level, amounts to 
a rejection of the belief that causally-focused models are the explanatory means that best equip 
us to understand the world. While it could be argued that the author of the Tractatus developed a 
static conception of logical possibility, one which, if harnessed by means of continuous analysis, 
had the potential to explain the external world vis a vis language, this still does not necessarily 
justify the early Wittgenstein as the philosophical counterpart to the Newtonian scientific 
tradition. The early Wittgenstein advocated for a world of fixed propositions, true, but not one in 
which everyday experiences are explained by means of the creation of scientifically inspired 
ontological tools of philosophy (such as sense-data or Russellian universals and concepts). The 
early Wittgenstein, via the promotion of referentialism and logical perfectionism,1 relied upon a 
static system in which words and sentences received their meaning based upon their posited 
correspondence to an underlying logical backbone of language and the world.2 Thus, it should 
be said that, though the reactions of Goethe and the later Wittgenstein are united under similar 
scientific ideologies, the things against which they are reacting, while analogous in certain 
respects, should not be confused as representing precisely corresponding philosophical and 
scientific camps. Newton and the early Wittgenstein may be similar targets for Goethe and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  1 By using the term “referential”, I am relying on Robert Fogelin’s particular reading of Wittgenstein’s 
later criticism of philosophy. Fogelin classifies Augustine’s quote above, as well as the work of the 
Tractatus as essentially referential. Fogelin writes, “Although Wittgenstein’s criticisms of philosophy are 
multifaceted and complex, at least for convenience, I shall divide them into two broad categories: the first 
is an attack on what I will call referentialism, the second an attack on what I shall call, for lack of a better 
name, logical perfectionism.”  
	  
2 In section 108 of the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein refers to this as the “crystalline structure 
of language.” See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2009), P.M.S. 
Hacker (ed.)	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later Wittgenstein, respectively, but it should be noted early in this paper that I believe them to 
be related insomuch as they both represent methods of science on one hand, and philosophy on 
the other, that construct static, generalized systems claiming to explain the world by theories 
based upon predictive qualities focused on replicating outward imitation.  
Rather than reconstruct or revise logical atomism, as Wittgenstein originally did when he 
adapted and revised the ideas of Russell and Frege with the publication of the Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus, the Philosophical Investigations shifts from a project engaged in establishing 
fixed rules and definitions of language and propositions to, instead, understanding meaning by 
means of a type of relational classification of word usage. Wittgenstein’s terms this primary 
method used to debunk language games. Language games, to be certain, are intentionally 
derived from the word “game.” Wittgenstein uses the word “game” as an example to illustrate 
many of the difficulties with the ideas outlined above (logical perfectionism and referentialism). 
In the beginning of the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein provides a rather broad 
definition of a language game, “We can also think of the whole process of using words in 
[primitive languages] as one of those games by means of which children learn their native 
language. I will call these games ‘language games’ and will sometimes speak of a primitive 
language as a language game.”3 In the same section, Wittgenstein adds, “And the processes of 
naming the stones and of repeating words after someone might also be called language games… 
I shall also call the whole, consisting of language and the activities into which it is woven, and 
‘language game’.”4 Surely, classifying the whole of language – and the activities into which it is 
woven – as a language game is incredibly broad, and - even more so - incredibly ambitious. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Ibid. Section 7 
	  
4 Ibid. Section 7	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Wittgenstein does, however, begin to explain language, albeit indirectly, in terms of the need for, 
and function of, language games. Thus, understanding the word “game” is key to understanding 
the later Wittgenstein’s new perspective.  
 Attempting to understand words independently of their use – i.e. in terms of strict 
definitions supported by the strict rules of logic – provides only one particular component of a 
word’s meaning.5 The later Wittgenstein argues that, to truly understand language, it is 
imperative to view words in terms of the variety of potential uses, or, in other words, the field of 
possibilities relating to a word’s use. To illustrate, Wittgenstein provides a discussion of the 
word “game”. The Wittgenstein of the Tractatus would surely argue that a rule of logic applies 
to the general form of the word “game.” Indeed, if our language is supported by fixed rules of 
logic, then “game” could only be understood in terms of one particular, generalized, and 
universally applicable meaning. This, however, is not the case. The word “game”, Wittgenstein 
points out, is disconcertingly difficult to universally define. Wittgenstein writes,  
Consider, for example, the activities that we call “games”. I mean board-
games, card-games, ball-games, athletic-games, and so on. What is 
common to them all? Don’t say: ‘They must have something in common, 
or they would not be called games’ – but look and see whether there is 
anything common to all. – For if you look at them, you won’t see 
something that is common to all, but similarities, affinities, and a whole 
series of them at that. To repeat: don’t think, but look! – Look, for 
example, at board games, with their various affinities. Now pass to card 
games; here you find many correspondences with the first group, but many 
common features drop out, and other appear. When we pass next to ball 
games, much that is common is retained, but much is lost. – Are they all 
“entertaining”? Compare chess with noughts and crosses. Or is there 
always winning and losing, or competition between players? Think of 
patience. In ball games there is winning and losing; but when a child 
throws his ball at the wall and catches it again, this feature has 
disappeared… And we can go through the many, many other groups of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 See Wittgenstein’s attack on Augustinian referentialism in the beginning passages of the Philosophical 
Investigations. This is discussed further in greater detail in this paper.	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games in the same way, and can see how similarities crop up and 
disappear. 
And the upshot of these considerations is: we see a complicated network 
of similarities overlapping and crisscrossing: similarities in the large and 
in the small.6  
Wittgenstein’s intention here is to demonstrate the inherent issues that arise when relying 
on only one set of rules or a single definition to understand concepts. Instead, the later 
Wittgenstein prompts the reader to consider the development of definitions in different 
contexts. Rather than containing one set of rules or definitions for a particular word, there 
are, in fact, multiple variations on a single form.  
Augustine, we might say, does describe a system of 
communication; only not everything that we call language is this system. 
And one has to say this in several cases where the question arises “Will 
that description do or not?” The answer is: “Yes, it will, but only for this 
narrowly circumscribed area, not for the whole of what you are purporting 
to describe.” 
 It is as if someone were to say, “Playing a game consists in moving 
objects about on a surface according to certain rules…” – and we replied: 
You seem to be thinking of board games, but they are not all the games 
there are. You can rectify your explanation by expressly restricting it to 
those games.7 
Language games themselves allow us to understand concepts in terms of communicative 
interactions – interactions lending meaning to words through their specific use. In section 
43 of the Investigations, Wittgenstein writes, “For a large class of cases of the 
employment of the word ‘meaning’ – that not for all – this word can be explained in this 
way: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.”8 The mistake often made by 
philosophers (including the author of the Tractatus), the later Wittgenstein believes, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Ibid. Section 66.  
 
7 Ibid, Section 3. 
8 Ibid. Section 43.	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comes about when a strict definition of a word is presumed to apply universally – that is, 
to all instances of use. For example, when it is assumed – as in the case of the word 
“game” above – that a strict rule of meaning can be applied to all instances of use, 
philosophers inevitably misattribute rules of use that might apply in certain cases, but, to 
use Wittgenstein’s terminology, disappear in other related, but very different, instances. 
Thus Wittgenstein’s association between the word “game” and the multiplicity of related 
rules of use governing a word is not only helpful in the course of understanding how 
Wittgenstein uses language games, but also in understanding language games themselves.  
I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than 
“family resemblances”; for the various resemblances between members of 
a family – build, features, colour of eyes, gait temperament, and so on and 
so forth – overlap and criss-cross in the same way. – And I shall say 
‘games’ for family.  
And likewise the kinds of number, for example, form a family. Why do we 
call something a “number”? Well, perhaps because it has a direct – affinity 
with several things that have hitherto been called “number”; and this can 
be said to give it an indirect affinity with other things that we also call 
“numbers”. And we extend our concept of number, as in spinning a thread 
we twist fibre on fibre. And the strength of the thread resides not in the 
fact that some one fibre runs through its whole length, but in the 
overlapping of many fibres.9  
 The wide variety of activities that are classified as “games” is analogous to the 
multiplicity of language games that constitute a given language. While the early 
Wittgenstein attempted to expose an envisioned atomic logical architecture supporting a 
language, the later Wittgenstein’s structure of language is based upon commonalities of 
association and usage linking concepts and situations in which words are used. 
Wittgenstein writes, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Philosophical Investigations. Section 67.  
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 For someone might object against me: “You make things easy for 
yourself! You talk about all sorts of language games, but have 
nowhere said what is essential to a language game, and so to 
language: what is common in all of these activities, and makes them 
into language or parts of language. So you let yourself off the very 
part of the investigation that once gave you the most headache, the 
part about the general form of the proposition and of language.” And 
this is true. – Instead of pointing out something common to all that we 
call language, I’m saying that these phenomena have no one thing in 
common in virtue of which we use the same word for all – but there 
are many different kinds of affinity between them. And on account of 
this affinity, or these affinities, we call them all “languages”.10  
Thus it is by understanding language games – specifically the differences and affinities between 
similar games – that the later Wittgenstein believes we can avoid the problems of absolutist 
conceptions of meaning.  
While the broad similarities between the conception and role of philosophy of 
Wittgenstein can be seen in Goethe’s understanding of science in many of his scientific works, 
such as Theory of Colours, it is in On the Metamorphosis of Plants that we see a direct link 
between actual scientific and methodological concepts that are intellectually diffused from the 
science of Goethe to the philosophy of Wittgenstein. In much of Goethe’s scientific work up to 
this point there is a steady development of the Gestalt, a concept that heavily influenced the 19th 
century German Romanticist notion of organic-scientific understanding as a possible alternative 
to explanatory frameworks focused on explaining an event through isolating the phenomenon’s 
causal nexus and using a model to produce standardized outputs. I will trace the Romantic 
movements general development in later chapters, but it is important to at least make note of 
these matters before moving forward.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Ibid. Section 65 
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Gestalt, which has the literal translation of “shape” or “form”11 means something much 
more specific when used in the Goethian context. It is, simply put, an observable pattern that is 
but one of a multiplicity of instances – a natural form from which all observable varieties of an 
object exist. This technique of isolating the Gestalt originally came to Goethe during time spent 
in Italy at the Garden at Padua, where he focused on the leaves of palm trees, and later in Sicily 
where he saw the uniformity of diversified plant structures in leaves of a fennel plant12. It was in 
Sicily where this “flash” of understanding came to Goethe that the multiplicity of floral 
structures share certain features of forms that make up an organized whole (Gestalt).  
 While the concept of the Gestalt appears throughout the German intellectual tradition, it 
should be noted that the link between the traditional use of the word by Goethe and its more 
recently developed psychological root (Wolfgang Köhler’s Gestalt Psychology) can be found in 
Goethe, whose philosophy of science was a very important influence on Köhler’s development 
of the Gestalt psychological approach.13  According to Wittgenstein biographer Ray Monk, while 
the term usually means “shape” or “form,” “Köhler, following Goethe, used [the word] to mean 
something quite different.” Monk quotes Köhler as writing: 
In the German language – at least since the time of Goethe, and especially 
in his own papers on the natural science – the noun ‘gestalt’ has two 
meanings: besides the connotation of ‘shape’ or ‘form’ as a property of 
things, it has the meaning of a concrete individual and characteristic 
entity, existing as something detached and having a shape of form as one 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 See Monk, op. cit. 509. 
	  
12 Gordon L. Miller, introduction to On the Metamorphosis of Plants, Goethe (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT 
Press, 2009) xvii.   
	  
13 It should also be noted that Köhler is cited in Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology – A Fragment. 
Section 180.  
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of its attributes. Following this tradition, in gestalttheorie the word 
‘gestalt’ means any segregated whole. 14 
 
 As Monk notes, what is important about this connection is its relationship to Goethe’s 
own project, namely, the creation and promotion of a school of psychological thought standing in 
opposition to what Monk calls the “mechanism implicit in behavioralism.”15 Again there lies a 
common theme of the creation of an organically-focused explanatory model in reaction to an 
explanatory model concerned with causally-based understanding. Monk argues that 
Wittgenstein’s interest in Köhler’s work was further cemented by both thinkers’ “common 
inheritance” of Goethian morphological methodology.16  The concept of the Gestalt, when 
applied to the morphology of plant life, brought Goethe to posit that there could exist a single 
form or idea from which the multiplicity of related forms stem. In other words, just as the Gestalt 
is the sum of all varieties of a particular thing, there could also exist a single form from which 
the each point within a field of possible variations could be derived; Goethe termed this concept 
the Urphänomen.17  Plant life, Goethe theorized, could very well contain an Urphänomen uniting 
the varieties occurring under the morphological framework overtime – this original form from 
which all varieties of floral life morphed from was what Goethe termed the Urpflanze.18 The 
need to link similar forms of life to not only understand them, but also identify them is expressed 
by Goethe when he writes “How could I recognize that this or that form was a plant if all were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 See Monk pp. 323.  
15 Ibid. 323 
16 Ibid. 324 
17 Gordon Miller ibid., xix.  
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not built upon the same basic model?”19 This basic model, however, should not be misconstrued 
as akin to a sort of biological universal concept. As Goethe is writing in order to avoid an overly 
mechanistic, Newtonian understanding of the world, it is clear that to construct a rigid way to 
categorize concepts (as is the case with a Russellian conception of a universal) would be highly 
problematic to Goethe. Goethe is instead constructing a dynamic understanding of nature, one 
that consists of interwoven similarities and differences, as well as the relationships that 
individual objects share via these similarities and differences.  
3.0 LINKING GOETHE AND WITTGENSTEIN 
3.1 LANGUAGE GAMES AND THE URPFLANZE 
 Although Goethe originally believed his Urpflanze to exist in the natural world, he 
eventually came to regard the idea of the this “Primal Plant” as an experimental tool to be used 
by the scientist when attempting to understand the relationship between plants - both 
developmentally as well as ecologically. If we hearken back to the later-Wittgenstein’s 
explanation of primal languages and their relation to language games, we can see a very clear 
methodological analogy, one rooted in understanding phenomena in terms of organic 
development rather than causal chains. Along this line of reasoning, we could subscribe to the 
following: to better understand that which exists in the real world, it is often helpful to apply a 
hypothetical system to understand all logical possible extension. While this is nothing 
philosophically or scientifically groundbreaking – traditional science is, after all, an inferential 
framework concerned with producing consistent results through standardized methods and 
predicting future behavior – it is helpful in linking both Wittgenstein and Goethe’s utilization of 
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the theoretical Gestalt to connect similar, but at the same time differing pieces of phenomena. It 
should be noted, however, that the difference between the Primal Plant – or primal language-
language games – and traditional scientific modeling is the extent to which these hypothetical 
models correspond to both the external world, possible events, and shed light upon 
corresponding differences between them.20 This modeling is not causal, but logical. Goethe 
writes, “The Urpflanze is going to be the strangest creature in the world, which nature herself 
shall envy men. With this model and the key to it, it will be possible to go on forever inventing 
plants and know that their existence is logical [my italics]; that is to say, if they do not actually 
exist, they could.”21  The Primal Plant is an archetype from which we can better understand the 
possible and actual variety of plants. Goethe is, in essence, assembling the basic set of ideas that 
would be examined in Wittgenstein’s discussion of language games - the variations between 
certain interactions that can be classified under a broad title or description. Take, for example, 
Wittgenstein’s examination of the concept “game” in section 66 of Philosophical Investigations: 
 Consider, for example, the activities that we call “games”. I mean board-
games, card-games, ball-games, athletic games, and so on. What is 
common to them all? — Don’t say: They must have something in 
common, or they would not be called ‘games’” — but look and see 
whether there is anything common to all. — For if you look at them, you 
won’t see something that is common to all, but similarities, affinities, and 
a whole series of them at that. To repeat: don’t think, but look!22 
These language games are - if looked at in Goethian terms - the variety of possibilities of the 
concepts contained in Urphenomenen. The affinities between the different kinds of plants, as 
varied in appearance and ecological function as they may be, allows one to explain the individual 
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21 On the Metamorphosis of Plants. Pp. 310.  
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in terms of not only other individual plants within the pattern, but also allows us to understand 
these phenomena in terms of the one broad concept from which they are derived. They are a 
demonstration of language’s field of possibilities. It is appropriate to mention, however, that this 
concept is not meant to explain the origin of the how we understand the term “plant,” but is 
instead meant to facilitate our understanding of the relationship between individual things that 
fall categorization the term to provide a reasonable, multivariable definition of the term, a 
definition that is appropriately used in different, albeit similar cases. This is an example of, as 
Monk uses the term,23 an übersicht or, in English, a “synoptic view.” This synoptic view allows 
us to clarify the relation between concepts. Wittgenstein, I will argue, instead intends this 
particular recognition of shared similarities to allow us to understand the concept in relation to 
the various routes that language is able to take in a real world linguistic environment, as well as 
the relationship between these routes themselves.24   
An attempt to trace to an actual common origin, - whether pseudo evolutionary or 
cognitively by means of universals – would, Wittgenstein writes in Logik, Sprache, Philosophie, 
“recognize only a single scheme for such similarities...”25 Wittgenstein instead urges us to look 
and see the various possible schemes for such similarities. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 See Monk, op. cit. 510. 
	  
24 See Monk, ibid., 303., where the connection is made between Spengler’s conception of causality and 
Goethe’s morphology.  Indeed, as Monk notes, Wittgenstein is noted as saying in a lecture, “what I give 
is the morphology of the use of an expression.”  
	  
25 F. Waisman, The Principles of Linguistic Philosophy, (Macmillan, 1965). R. Harre (ed.). quoted in 
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3.2 CITIES AND SUBURBS: LANGUAGE GROWTH AND THE FIELD OF 
LINGUISTIC POSSIBILITIES 
Our language can be regarded as an ancient city: a maze of little 
streets and squares, of old and new houses, of houses with 
extensions from various periods, and with all this surrounded by a 
multitude of new suburbs with straight and regular streets and 
uniform houses.26 
Language, to Wittgenstein, is, much like his metaphorical city, a network of constantly 
developing, and changing developments. Language is a constantly evolving phenomenon, one 
unable to be strictly defined the way that the early-Wittgenstein attempted. Language games are 
pictures of development that allow us to follow this theoretical progression of language (and its 
underlying rules of correctness). Rather than providing some sort of causal chain within 
language, piecing together words, object, and proper function, all hinging on sort of causal nexus 
justifying correct usage, language games allow us, much like Goethe in his Italian garden, to 
understand variations on a theme, debunking a phenomenon based upon a field of organically 
developing possibilities. The beginning passages of the Philosophical Investigations list 
numerous language games progressing is complexity, with Wittgenstein highlighting both the 
interconnectedness of the games via their similarities, as well as the vital distinctions between 
them with regards to differences in their underlying rules. Wittgenstein uses the following 
interaction to paint this picture: 
 Now think of the following language: I send someone shopping. I give him a slip 
of paper marked “five red apples.” He takes the slip to the shopkeeper, who opens 
the drawer marked “apples”; then he looks up the word “red” in a chart and finds 
a color sample next to it; then he says the series of elementary number-words – I 
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assume that he knows them by heart – up to the word “five”, and for each 
number-word he takes an apple of the same color as the sample out of the 
drawer.27 
Why take an interaction – one that many would execute with little thought, not to mention an 
incredibly streamlined method, and intentionally break it up into primitive, seemingly overly 
complicated, tasks? Even further, why engage in this sort of activity if simply everything 
happens to be a language game, relegated to the realm of therapeutic linguistic activity rather 
than diagnostic method?28 Wittgenstein uses this language game to break down linguistic 
activity, demonstrating the possible intersections for logical development and variations – such 
as the color of the apple, the type of fruit, etc. Each small piece of action within this example is 
meant to highlight the actual subliminal occurrences implicit within the language being used, 
with each primitive snap-shot of language further illuminating how this organic development is 
thought to progress. 
 Goethe’s idea of the Urpflanze was of a single leaf from which all varieties of plants 
could develop into a multiplicity of variations, the metamorphological process of which occurred 
due to progressive variations as it assumed the form of cotyledons, stem leaves, sepals, and 
various other parts of a plant. It is, so to speak, the common ancestor linking different plants 
together. Likewise, language games of situations, concepts, and words link one to another, much 
in the same way as common features link similar pieces of floral life to one another in the natural 
world. This linkage, it should be noted, is based upon logic, that is, what could be or could 
develop, based on a field of logical possibilities. Under this framework, logic is not viewed in 
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terms of what is – as in the case of the Tractatus, but what could be. This should be viewed in 
contrasting terms to a conception of development (or taxonomy) rooted in a causal model. This 
understanding of logical outgrowth should also be distinguished from the notion of a crystalline 
logic set forth in the Tractatus; this logic is not concerned with restricting possibilities through 
strict definition, but rather in understanding possible variations on one theme. Evidence of this 
direct link between family resemblances and morphological similarities can be seen in section 73 
of the Philosophical Investigations, where Wittgenstein writes: “One is now inclined to extend 
the comparison: to have understood the explanation means to have in one’s mind an idea of the 
thing explained, and that is a sample or picture.”29 This sample or picture that Wittgenstein notes 
that we may be inclined to understand a concept in terms of seems to be none other than 
something categorized and understood by means of a universal. Wittgenstein, however, moves 
further when, in the same section, he continues, “So if I’m shown a various leaves and told ‘this 
is a leaf’, I get an idea of the shape of the leaf, a picture in my mind [my italics]. — But what 
does the picture of a leaf look like when it does not show us any particular shape, but rather 
‘what is common to all shapes of leaf’ [my italics]?”30  
This common feature, that is, this each development of language games, showcases the 
variety of representations that the mental construction of a leaf could take. Wittgenstein argues 
that it is a “schema”, one of many, each of which will vary from person to person. The point is 
that we understand the meaning of the word “leaf” in Goethe’s terms, namely as a specific 
Urphenomenon that exists in the dynamic realm of the Gestalt – one in which we view a broad 
concept in terms of the whole series of specific examples, and recognize the multiplicity of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Philosophical Investigations. Section 73.  
30 Ibid. Section 73	  
	  
 
17	  
variations that are not bound to a specific, abstract set of criteria, but rather to multiple varieties 
of association and organization.  
 “For Goethe, experiments work by being placed in a series of similar and otherwise 
interlinked cases, which do not issue a theory, but might result in a certain community of 
vision.”31 Both Wittgenstein and Goethe are telling us to look, to see how each case of 
phenomenon is related to another. This is the foundation of the influence of Goethe in 
Wittgenstein’s work, and does not manifest itself anywhere more predominately than in the case 
of Wittgenstein’s language-games. Here we see Goethe’s experimental method applied not to 
explain the structural similarities and ecology of plants, but rather to the case of understanding 
how words retain meaning, and the relationship between the uses of those meanings in various 
situations. Language, Wittgenstein argues, can be ordered so that it may be “surveyable”32 in 
much the way that the plants in Goethe’s garden were. He uses language-games as a means to 
not only demonstrate the differences between different uses of language, but also to map these 
uses in surveyable form via the relations between games.33 Language-games allow one to arrange 
data in a way that enables the reader to develop a comparison of the uses of a given word in 
different circumstances and the resulting differing, case-specific meanings.  
Our clear and simple language-games are not preliminary studies 
for a future regimentation of language — as it were first 
approximations, ignoring friction and air resistance. Rather, the 
language-games stand as objects of comparison which, through 
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similarities and dissimilarities, are meant to throw light on features 
of our language.34 
These are tools used by Wittgenstein allowing for language to be arranged for examination in a 
way that allows us to “look”35 at words in a morphological manner - to see the affinity between 
the uses of a word - rather than one with concrete bounds and an idealized structure.  
 Contained within the dynamic and fluid bounds of the field of linguistic possibilities is 
Wittgenstein’s equivalent of the Urphenomenon, which under Wittgenstein’s project is the 
understanding and use of words (such as “game”, “plant”, etc). These words are, by most 
standards; impossible to define under a set of strict criteria  -as would be the case in a 
referentialist model. Using Goethe’s terminology, these words and concepts could be 
characterized as the linguistic equivalents of Primal Plants; they are not to be understood in 
terms of sentence by sentence notions of correct usage, but rather as general, archetypical ideas 
from which all specific objects can be traced back to. Language games, such as Wittgenstein’s 
shopkeeper, are intended to shed light on the field of possible uses, as well as each uses inherent 
complexity. 
 We can trace board games, card games, athletic games, as well as any other games back 
to a certain linguistic archetype, in much the same way that we can theorize a common ancestor 
in relation to whom all plants relate to one another. This theory allows us to, as Goethe 
speculated, invent new variations – new games – that can be seen in as part of the overall pattern 
of similar instances. This parallel between Goethe and Wittgenstein can only exist, however, if 
we take Wittgenstein to agree with Goethe that the linguistic equivalents to the Urpflanze does 
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not actually exist, but are rather our creation; it is a tool that we have created to begin to make 
language surveyable.  
4.0  STORM AND STRESS: MORPHOLOGY AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO 
LINNAEUS  
 The Romantic Movement echoed this feeling of reluctance to over-generalize the world 
in which they lived. Goethe, one of the German Romantic movement’s most influential thinkers, 
labored to approach scientific study in a way that would explain the world in scientific terms 
that were not causal, but rather evolutionary. This tendency to understand what is overlooked by 
means of traditional scientific activity placed Goethe in a unique place among the thinkers of his 
day. Indeed, Goethe’s poetry and scientific essays focused on a variety of scientific areas, 
beginning with physical anthropology and geology. Conscious of Kant’s work in biology and 
Herder’s work in History, among other, more Romantic leaning scientists of the Storm and 
Stress decade (roughly 1770-1780), Goethe first developed his own set of Romantic scientific 
methods and critique during his initial forays into commenting on these proto-anthropological 
advancements, which, while addressing a variety of concerns, focused on the relevance of race 
and the definition of various types of peoples. Goethe addressed these developments, 
particularly Kant’s “teleology of judgment” and Blumenbach’s “theory of epigenisis” in a series 
of short essays, titled “On Morphology” published between the years 1817 and 1822.36 While, 
on the whole, Goethe accepted Blumenbach’s organic theories of development, he maintained 
serious reservations about Blumenbach’s concepts of “force” and “drive,” proto-anthropological 
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mechanisms posited to facilitate physical variations among peoples. Goethe found these 
concepts “highly anthropomorphized”37.  
In [Goethe’s] view, these terms assume something “physical” (physich) and 
“mechanical” (mechanisch), and while they bring vitality to organized matter, 
they still leave us with a gap in the understanding of organic development, with  
“a dark incomprehensible point” (ein dunkler unbegreiflicher Punkt). Nor were terms like 
“evolution”, epigenisis, and “preformation” any help. These, too, he argued, could not be 
understood without a concept of forms in process, of metamorphosis38…  
The concept of forms in process – metamorphosis - would prove vital to Goethe’s approach to 
scientific work, emphasizing an intimacy with nature that is characteristic of not only the Storm 
and Stress decade, but also German Romanticism as a whole. The common thread of an 
apprehensiveness to rely on one aspect of scientific explanation – the physical and mechanical – 
runs parallel to Herztian apprehensions targeted at the ability of science to explain the world in 
its totality.  
 Much in the same way that the later-Wittgenstein urges his readers to “turn their inquiry 
around”, in effect repositioning the ways in which questions are answered and - perhaps most 
importantly for our purposes - addressed, Goethe, utilizing an alternative Romanticist scientific 
approach, also repositioned familiar studies by adjusting methodological and ideological 
approaches. The result of this repositioning was, crudely speaking, Goethe’s production and 
execution of scientific studies that would become “basic” to the further evolutions of sciences, 
making it possible to trace entire lineages of scientific discoveries back to Goethe’s scientific 
work. Indeed, Goethe’s work in botany is characterized by the subtitle of his first major work in 
botany, 1817’s On Morphology: The Formation and Transformation of Organisms, where we are 
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given an indication of the notion of non-static, evolutionarily organic explanations of natural 
phenomena.  
 Simply put, Goethe used his morphological scientific model to provide an alternative to 
the biological work of Linnaeus. Linnaeus had brought botanical studies to a “standstill”39, 
effectively putting an end to the work of the scientists and philosophers that had preceded him by 
constructing a system of classification to organize the entire plant kingdom. This system, 
however, is and was itself artificially constructed, not to mention composed of rigidly defined 
distinctions between species. After all, Linnaean taxonomy classifies plants based upon 
individual, outward characteristics - the arrangement and number of stamens and pistils, etc. 
Rudolf Magnus writes, “In the practical application of this system Linnaeus and his successors 
saw the main task of scientific botany. Linnaeus himself declared that the best botanist was he 
who had learned to know and distinguish the greatest number of species.”40 Thus the question of 
botany in Goethe’s time boiled down to be a question of systems. That is, what kinds of systems 
work best to describe and explain the natural world - closed, static systems tuned to outwardly 
mimic natural events by means of an inferential framework or an organic, morphological system 
allowing for the natural development and theoretical construction of phenomena based upon 
intricately balanced relationships between objects?   
 Linnaeus and - his followers, by extension - agreed “various species in his systems had 
existed immutably since the beginning of creation, that they were sharply marked plant groups 
among which there were no transitions.”41 This should immediately conjure similarities between 
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this Linnaean classification system and the early Wittgenstein, essentially producing similarly 
constructed - and idealized - systems believed to organize and explain the world in terms of 
corresponding, rigidly defined groups and classifications. Like the later-Wittgenstein, Goethe’s 
own observations led him different conclusions as to the best methods of understanding plant 
life, instead opting to expand classification beyond the outward characteristics of plants. Goethe 
agreed with Linnaeus that in certain genera, each individual plant persistently exhibited the same 
external characteristics, thus eliminating doubts arising around the plant’s correct place among 
the Linnaean species. However, Goethe provides room for a more fluid system of floral variation 
(much like Wittgenstein’s “multiplicity”) when he acknowledges “...plant groups, such as roses, 
which [Goethe] describes as ‘characterless,’ since individual plants show extraordinarily wide 
variation, even in essential characteristics, making it difficult to determine to which species the 
individual belongs. Thus Goethe found even then that many transition forms between Linnaean 
species occur.”42  Goethe’s conclusions, then, would make it very difficult for ideas of ideal fixed 
systems of plant classification to hold weight, resulting in diminishing faith in the existence of 
“fixed, immutable species.”43  
 What contributed to this variation among plants within specific Linnaean species, Goethe 
believed, was related to environmental factors. Over the course of his botanical research, Goethe 
became increasingly convinced that outward plant form was conditioned by the plant’s 
surrounding environment, leading him to conclude, “changes in the environment could give rise 
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to varieties within a species.”44 The development of these beliefs lead Goethe to reject crucial 
tenants of Linnaean classification, specifically the immutability of floral forms.  
 Goethe, in his notebooks from his stay in Palermo discussed above, writes:  
I tried to find wherein these many and diverse forma [plants] were different, one from the 
other. And always I found them more like than unlike. Whenever I sought to apply my 
botanical nomenclature, I fared well enough, but it seemed idle and made me uneasy, 
availing me nothing. My fine poetic resolutions were frustrated... Why are we moderns so 
distraught? Why are we challenged to demands we can neither attain nor fulfill?  
Goethe felt that the strict Linnaean nomenclature not only failed to take account of essential 
differences and similarities between plant forms, but also, similarly to the later Wittgenstein, 
restricted by the strictness in which the system classified and explained the relations between 
similar groupings of plant subjects. 
5.0  THE INFLUENCE OF GOETHE ON WITTGENSTEIN 
 “The influence of Goethe on Wittgenstein is just beginning to be appreciated. Hacker and 
Baker, Westphal, Monk, and Haller have all drawn attention to the significant affinities between 
the two men’s work…”45 Even still, while the similarities between the work of both men may 
seem unremarkable, in Wittgenstein’s collection of personal notes, published as Culture and 
Value , Wittgenstein omits Goethe from a personal list of his primary influences that includes 
Hertz, Frege, Schopenhauer, among others. A possible explanation for this exclusion could be 
rooted in Wittgenstein’s alleged acceptance of the ideas of Oswald Spengler – who, it should be 
noted, was included in the list contained in Culture and Value. James Klagge, commenting on the 
absence of Goethe on Wittgenstein’s list of influences, argues that the omission could be based 
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upon an apparent philosophically anachronistic conflict in citing a thinker from Goethe’s 
historical period in Wittgenstein’s times. Working within the confines of Spengler’s philosophy 
of history, this - at least to Spengler - anachronistic incompatibility arises from an attempt to 
reconcile what Spengler categorizes to be two different “life contexts” – Goethe’s in the 
transition from the 18th to the 19th century, and Wittgenstein’s in the first half of the 20th century.	  
46 As both Monk47 and Klagge note: linking these life contexts would be historically incoherent 
within Spengler’s historical-philosophical framework. In Spengler’s ideas, we find both a 
framework to exclude Goethe from directly stated intellectual influence, while also finding a 
possible intellectual surrogate put into place by Wittgenstein to justify the utilization of the ideas 
of a previous historical stage.  
Each culture has its own new possibilities of self-expression which arise, 
ripen, decay and never return. There is not one sculpture, one painting, one 
mathematics, one physics, but many, each in its deepest essence, different 
from the others, each limited in duration and self-contained, just as each 
species of plant has its peculiar blossom or fruits, its special type of 
growth and decline. These Cultures, sublimated life-essences, grow with 
the same superb aimlessness as the flowers of the field. They belong, like 
the plants and the animals, to the living Nature of Goethe, and not to the 
dead Nature of Newton. I see world-history as a picture of endless 
formations and transformations of the marvelous waxing and waning of 
organic forms.48  
History, according to Spengler, is a series of cultural growth, flourishing, and subsequent 
deterioration.49 This cyclical analysis and explanation of historical events, and the cultural and 
intellectual development accompanying them, assuming Wittgenstein did, indeed subscribe to 
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47 See Monk, op. cit., 302-303. 
	  
48 Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West. Abridged edition. Oxford University Press. 1991. Pp. 17-      
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Spengler’s ideas at the level attributed by Monk and Klagge, would have left Wittgenstein with a 
kind of metaphysical puzzle surrounding his list of intellectual influences. That is to say, if, 
under Spengler’s assessment, the flowering period of the 18th and 19th centuries had been 
achieved, and the 20th century period is believed to be one of deterioration, how could 
Wittgenstein synthesize influence from a period of developmental climax with one that has been 
compromised by inevitable decay? The problem of Wittgenstein’s notable exclusion, assuming 
he did, in fact subscribe to Spengler’s understanding of historical stages, has its origins in 
difficulties of anachronism – “What problems are involved in someone from one stage of an era 
endorsing views from another stage?”50  Also arising from Spengler’s philosophy of history is an 
understanding of the study of history – and, indeed all intellectual fields – that places an 
emphasis on the organic growth of states of affairs, based upon an ever growing and changing 
field of possibilities from which we can organize and understand information in relation to both 
the development of certain phenomena between each instance of occurrence, as well as our 
ability to understand each occurrence by engaging in situational diagnostics that align very 
similarly to the language games in question.  
 While Klagge attempts to give an explanation for Wittgenstein’s omission of Goethe 
from his list of influences, others have instead attempted to map the genealogy of this link within 
Wittgenstein’s work by highlighting similarities in method, scientific ideology, and general 
similarities in the understanding of the workings of the external world that lie between them. To 
truly understand the link between Wittgenstein and Goethe, it is necessary to isolate and examine 
the parallels between the scientific method and ideology that exist between the works of both 
men. While Rowe does address Goethe’s scientific method and ideology, it seems that his main 
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interest resides in demonstrating the conjunction between the two men in an attempt to account 
for literary and stylistic similarities. After all, he is attempting to answer questions posed by 
Stanley Cavell, that is, “Why does [Wittgenstein] write this way? Why doesn’t he just say what 
he means, and draw instead of insinuate conclusions?”51 While these questions posed by Cavell 
are emphatically valid, and by all means some of the first questions that come to mind when first 
getting acquainted with Wittgenstein’s work - both early as well as late – they do not generate 
the depth of understanding of Wittgenstein that we wish to attain. That is, these are questions that 
while important on a surface level – an initial comprehension of Wittgenstein’s philosophy – 
they are only deeply important when examining Wittgenstein in light of his New Wittgenstein52 
form. Cavell’s questions lead to an examination that is stylistic rather than methodological. 
Focusing on why Wittgenstein doesn’t simply grant us his conclusion inevitably leads us to the 
understanding that Wittgenstein is providing us with this philosophical therapy; he is seen to be 
constructing a kind of philosophy that leaves the reader to decide exactly what Wittgenstein 
intends. After all, if what Wittgenstein intends is left open to subjective conclusions, that is, 
conclusions that vary from one reader to another, we have no choice but to appeal to a 
therapeutic reading.  
 If we begin by examining and analyzing the striking similarities between Goethe’s 
conception of science and Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy, and proceed to synthesize 
the corresponding methodological explanations linking the two, it would seem, then, that Goethe 
and Wittgenstein could be intellectually linked.  That is it, if both thinkers are in fact linked by 
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both methodology as well as scientific and philosophical ideology, then we could use Goethe’s 
clarity with regard to results, intentions, and method as a useful means to attempt to understand 
why Wittgenstein writes the way he does, as well as what philosophical, epistemological, and 
linguistic conclusions he is advocating for. To speak in specifics, reaching an understanding of 
Goethe’s scientific goals brings Wittgenstein’s philosophical intentions into much clearer focus. 
It is mainly a question of method, rather than style, that brings us to a connection between 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy viewed in relation to Goethian science. Again, if we are to turn our 
own inquiry around, as was mentioned earlier a Goethian lens, it seems, could be a particularly 
promising place to begin.  
If the point of Wittgenstein’s later writings are subject to, and contain, a traceable goal, 
one that is not left to one reader or another to interpret, but rather to understand why he uses the 
philosophical tools that he does to appeal to readers universally, we will be better equipped to 
answer the aforementioned questions arising from Wittgenstein’s philosophy. Some scholars 
have focused on Goethe’s work the Theory of Colours to trace the proposed Wittgenstein-Goethe 
parallel.53  Goethe’s work with light and color was a direct response to Newtonian theories of 
light.54  To Goethe, the Newtonian scientific method devalues the world in which one lives – it 
condenses the world into one of sheer mechanism, explaining it in terms of mathematical 
abstraction, leaving one with senses that proved to be not only doubtable, but also ultimately 
deceptive. It is important to mention that Spengler’s philosophy of history describes the period of 
decay as being associated with mechanical structure and abstract detachment rather than the 
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54 I found Robert J. Richards’ The Romantic Conception of Life: Science and Philosophy in the Age of 
Goethe particularly helpful in my attempts to understand the relationship between Romantic conceptions 
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organic nature associated with the multiplicity of the natural world.55  Wittgenstein had extreme 
reservations when it came to granting scientific explanation and modeling56 a position of 
unchecked power; both Wittgenstein and Goethe were vehemently opposed to scientism, at least 
in terms of believing that the causal explanations traditional of science should be taken as all 
encompassing explanations of the external world.	  57I will go into greater detail regarding the 
nature of the philosophy of science and its relation to Wittgenstein and Goethe in later sections, 
but it is important to our current discussion to at least briefly introduce this point here: treating 
phenomena as understandable only in terms of the ideal, abstract, and theoretical, and, most 
importantly, as a matter of explanation in sole terms of an event’s causal nexus, fails to recognize 
the multiplicity of the number of possible outcomes that could result in a particular process 
according Wittgenstein. 
 To use Wittgenstein’s analogy, it is the “rough ground” (PI 107) upon which we must 
tread if we are to walk.58  To achieve the level of linguistic friction required to traverse this 
ground, we cannot rely solely upon the ideal for the totality of linguistic and epistemic 
explanation; the ideal is, after all, too vacuous, too slippery to be relied upon as the only terms of 
explanation.  
6.0  SCIENCE, ABSOLUTISM, AND UNDERSTANDING 
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56 See Goethe, Theory of Colours, trans. C.L. Eastlake (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1970) ii. Quoted in 
Rowe op. cit. 287.	  
	  
58 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2009), P.M.S. Hacker (ed.) §. 
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With the distinction having been drawn between the ideas against which Goethe and the 
later Wittgenstein are reacting, it is now appropriate to focus discussion on the overlapping 
methods and scientific ideologies binding these reactions together. After all, if those that Goethe 
and the later Wittgenstein are reacting against - Newton (and Linnaeus by extension)59 and the 
early Wittgenstein - ought not to be thought of as ideologically interchangeable, then it would 
follow that, if there is to be any link between the ideas of Goethe and the later Wittgenstein, that 
their respective methodologies – and ideologies, for that matter – would be have to be linked by 
common understandings regarding the role of science and philosophy to be played in addressing 
themes relating to understanding the world. Consider the following methodological approach of 
classical mechanics to explain phenomena:60 
a. The objects of physics – rigid rods, planes without friction, etc – are inherently idealized in 
the sense that no real objects can enjoy these purified traits.  
b. That physics is free to set up any “inferential engine” for generating conclusions as long as 
the results are “formally adequate” for science’s predictive ends. 
c. Because of (a) and (b), a body of physical law merely provides a set of “regulative 
principles” to which all subsequent scientific description is required to conform. 
 
This three-part method provides an outline of how, exactly, traditional science (or, at the very 
least, classical mechanics) operates with regard to explaining the everyday world, the products 
of which, while helpful in explaining certain phenomena, do not, under a Goethian scientific 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Linnaeus will be discussed later in the paper. However, for my purposes, it is important to note that 
Linnaeus’ taxonomical system will be discussed as being rooted in the Newtonian scientific tradition. 
That is, Linnaeus created a system of classification in which species are classified as being distinctly, and, 
I argue, idealistically separate from strikingly similar species. At the very least, Newton and Linnaeus 
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60 This outline has been reprinted from Mark Wilson’s article, “Wittgenstein: Physica Sunt, Non 
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framework, provide complete explanation. By utilizing ideal objects and calculations under an 
understood framework, scientists are able to provide inferential processes in order to predict a 
standardized outcome, the standardization of which leads to the construction (or ontologizing) of 
a set of laws under which future scientific engines are expected to conform. “Science is alleged 
to achieve its predictive objectives by clamping rather artificial descriptions onto ordinary 
sensory presentations and running the results through artificially constructed inferential 
machinery.”61 This passage, printed in Mark Wilson’s article “Wittgenstein: Physica Sunt, Non 
Leguntur” to describe the methodology of “classical mechanics,” is from the work of H. Hertz.62 
Hertz, vis a vis Wilson, argues that “Science is dedicated solely to framing rules that develop a 
shifting set of ‘images’ serving as ‘adequate representations’ of real-life behavior; it does not, 
however, care whether these representations move in the same way as the events they faithfully 
shadow.”63 The early Wittgenstein addresses this problem as well:  
Newtonian mechanics, for example, brings the description of the universe 
to a unified form. Let us imagine a white surface with irregular black 
spots. We now say: Whatever kind of picture these make I can always get 
as near as I like to its description, if I cover the surface with a sufficiently 
fine square network and now say of every square that it is white or black. 
In this way I shall have brought the description of the surface to a unified 
form. This form is arbitrary, because I could have applied with equal 
success a net with a triangular or hexagonal mesh. It can happen that the 
description would have been simpler with the aid of a triangular mesh; that 
is to say we might have described the surface more accurately with a 
triangular, and coarser, than with the finer square mesh, or vice versa, and 
so on. To the different networks correspond different systems of 
describing the world. Mechanics determine a form of description by 
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saying: All propositions in the description of the world must be obtained 
in a given way from a number of given propositions—the mechanical 
axioms. It thus provides the bricks for building the edifice of science, and 
says: Whatever building thou wouldst erect, thou not the form of one 
particular law, but of any law of a certain sort construct it in some manner 
with these bricks and these alone. (As with the system of numbers one 
must be able to write down any arbitrary number, so with the system of 
mechanics one must be able to write down any arbitrary physical 
proposition.)64 
That is to say, the “adequate representations” that Wilson notes as being produced by traditional 
(i.e. Newtonian, classical, or statically modeled) methods are not concerned with reproducing or 
explaining underlying characteristics that reach beyond mere outward performance. 
Wittgenstein writes: 
But wait! – if “Now I understand the system” does not mean the 
same as “The formula … occurs to me” (or “I utter the formula”, “I write 
it down,” etc.) – does it follow from this that I employ the sentence “Now 
I understand” or “Now I can go on” as a description of a process occurring 
behind or side by side that of uttering the formula?  
If something has to stand ‘behind the utterance of the formula’, it 
is particular circumstances which warrant my saying that I can go on – if 
the formula occurs to me. 
Just for once, don’t think of understanding as a ‘mental process’ at 
all! – For that is the way of talking which confuses you. Instead, ask 
yourself: in what sort of case, in what kind of circumstances, do we say 
“Now I know how to go on”? I mean, if the formula has occurred to me. – 
In the sense in which there are processes (including mental processes) 
which are characteristic of understanding, understanding is not a mental 
process. (A pain’s increasing, listening to a tune or a sentence – mental 
process.)65 
 
6.1  PROBLEMS WITH CAUSALLY-FOCUSED EXPERIENTIAL MODELS 
AS EXPLANATIONS OF PHENOMENA 
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To borrow Wilson’s example, consider a replication of yourself – a representation that, 
by all outward accounts, shares your appearance, one that can even mimic your personalized 
mannerisms and all other outward behavior through the use of some kind of strangely powerful 
algorithm. The replica, however, is supported and powered by means of hidden beams and 
connections that are blocked from your line sight by various odds and ends arising from your 
surroundings. The replication, while successfully mimicking your behavior and appearance, 
could not reasonably be thought to be an absolute replica of you without also replicating other, 
internal characteristics - however difficult to categorize, quantify, or define as they may be. The 
replica is, after all, an imitation; one created by utilizing standardized, predictive methods in 
hopes of replicating your behavior and appearance by means of a hidden mechanistic framework 
and the corresponding algorithm. In the verbiage of the romantics, to mistake the machine’s 
imitation of your appearance and behavior for a full explanation of your being is to overlook 
essential characteristics that may not be able to be fully standardized, or even strictly classified. 
In the later Wittgenstein’s terms, the machine may indeed have a limited vocabulary - we can 
even assume that it mirrors the “slab” vocabulary of Wittgenstein’s builders. Not only would the 
replica’s language be limited to an ostensibly-defined linkage between word and object, but, in 
Wittgenstein’s terms, the attribution of the same rules from your, more complex language to the 
limited, imitative language of your replica would be to dangerously generalize a similar set of 
rules that supposedly govern the activity of both languages.  Indeed, attributing the 
characteristics of the imitation – support beams, internal gears, etc – to yourself, or vice-versa 
would inevitably give rise to grave misunderstandings. That is to say, the replica is just a 
predictive model, one that uses its ability to replicate and predict to imitate outward 
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characteristics, not necessarily explain or fully replicate actual decision making processes 
beyond simple mannerisms and outward appearances.  
So, what I wanted to say was: if he suddenly knew how to go on, if 
he understood the system, then he may have had a distinctive experience – 
and if he is asked: “What was it? What took place when you suddenly 
grasped the system?”, perhaps he will describe it much as we described it 
[in the passage previously quoted] – but for us it is the circumstances 
under which he had such an experience that warrant him saying in such a 
case that he understands, that he knows how to go on. 
Similarly, consider a blind man, one who has been tirelessly educated in physics, human 
anatomy, and the history of Western art. He is familiar with manner in which Impressionist 
painters were able to use small brush strokes to blend different colors together to be seen from 
afar as an image or representation of a sunset or piece of fruit. Additionally, he has studied his 
physics to the level that he is critically aware of the phenomenon of color; he understands 
waves, their frequencies, and the way in which they are manipulated by the natural environment. 
Furthermore, his training in human anatomy and biology has equipped him with the ability to 
explain how and why our eyes are able to retrieve waves from the outside word, send electrical 
signals to the brain for processing, and the manner in which our brain reacts to this external 
stimuli. By all accounts we would understand this man to have an “understanding” of the way in 
which the phenomenon of color appears to function. Problematic still, just as in the case of the 
mechanical-mimic above, we would also, by most accounts, believe him to lack an actual 
firsthand understanding of color. That is to say, the man can explain the colors of a sunrise, or 
the way that a painting of this sunrise affects the human brain, but he lacks an intimate 
understanding of color in its most basic sense. Wittgenstein’s passages in the Philosophical 
Investigations about the “reading-machine” are a similar example to the one I’ve listed above: 
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Consider the following case: we use human beings, or creatures of 
some kind, as reading-machines. They are trained for this purpose. The 
trainer says of some that they can already read, of others that they cannot 
yet do so. Take the case of a pupil who has so far not participated in the 
training: if he is shown a written word, he will sometime produce random 
sounds, and now and again the sounds will ‘accidentally’ come out 
roughly right. A third person hears this pupil on such occasions and says, 
“he is reading”. But the teacher says, “No, he isn’t reading; that was just 
an accident”. – But let’s supposed that this pupil continues to react 
correctly to further words that are put before him. After a while, the 
teacher says, “Now he can read!” – But what of that first word? Is the 
teacher to say, “I was wrong, he did read it after all” – or, “He only began 
really to read later on”? – When did he begin to read? Which was the first 
word that he read? This question makes no sense here. Unless, indeed we 
stipulate: “The first word that a person ‘reads’ us the first word of the first 
series of 50 words that he reads correctly” (or something of the sort) 
If, on the other hand, we use “reading” to stand for a certain 
experience of transition from marks to spoken sounds, then it certainly 
makes sense to speak of the first word that he really read. He can then say, 
for example, “At this word, for the first time, I had the feeling: ‘now I am 
reading’.” 
Or again, in the different case of a reading-machine which 
translated marks into sounds, perhaps as a pianola does, it would be 
possible to say: “The machine read only after such-and-such had 
happened to it – after such-and-such parts had been connected by wires; 
the first word that it read was …”  
But in the case of the live reading-machine, “reading” meant: 
reacting to written signs in such-and-such ways. So this concept was quite 
independent of that of a mental or other mechanism. – Nor can the teacher 
here say of the trainee, “Perhaps he was already reading when he said that 
word”. For there is no doubt about what he did. – The change when the 
pupil began to read was a change in his behavior; and it makes no sense 
here to speak of a ‘first word in his new state’.66  
Thus, it seems, that while replication does not necessarily correspond to understanding, 
likewise, the production of results through a scientifically established inferential framework does 
not necessarily provide for a full explanation of a phenomenon or even a fully encompassing 
replication beyond that of outward appearances and predictive behavior. What conclusion, then, 
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are we to take from scientific ontologizing (i.e. science’s construction of laws and systems meant 
to replicate – and, indeed, explain – the world)? If we are to follow Hertz - and, by Wilson’s 
account, both the early and later Wittgenstein - it appears that we must accept that science 
engages in creating generalizing frameworks that explain portions of the world, albeit not the 
world in its entirety; indeed, a potential critique of science is that it misses or overlooks very 
important pieces of the world in an attempt to fully explain it is its inherent activity of 
generalization.  
If traditional science really is “engaged in a project of attaching generalizing barnacles 
onto the ship of ordinary life,”67 and Wittgenstein, for all accounts, subscribes to this cautious 
approach towards scientific explanation, then it becomes apparent that the role of science to 
Wittgenstein is to create theoretical simulation models of real world events and practices to 
parallel occurrences within the world through a series of representations. The actual link 
between the real world and these models is, in Wilson’s terms, “moot.” That is to say, these 
models are constructed to run independently, and, often times, their correspondence with actual 
real life cases is placed second to their ability to run as independent, theoretical systems 
supported by rules derived from real world experiences.  
6.2 LANGUAGE GAMES AS DIANGOSTIC TOOLS TO ISOLATE AND 
UNDERSTAND THE FIELD OF LINGUISTIC POSSIBILITIES 
As Wilson notes, Swiss engineer Franz Reuleaux revolutionized machine design when he 
proposed a new dissection of machines into “component parts.”68 This dissection of machinery 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 See Wilson pp. 296 
 
68 Ibid. pp. 291.  
	  
 
36	  
into parts was Reuleaux’s attempt to discover the “essence”69 of machinery - i.e. the underlying 
characteristics that guided discoveries of inventors. To arrive at this “essence,” Reuleaux 
proposed a “conceptual framework that extracts from real life machines a rather skeletal 
essence.”70 The implications of Reuleaux’s framework, then, is to abstract one’s understandings 
of certain machines to the point wherein mechanisms that may seem to lack noticeable 
similarities may actually be classified as the same mechanism. This essence, according to 
Reuleaux, is centered upon the question of whether or not two mechanisms have moving 
members that “trace a line or surface upon each other’s surface.”71 If the two mechanisms share 
these similar movements or related movements, then, according to Reuleaux, they are related by 
this common “essence.”  
Using this notion of a shared - albeit idealized - “essence” at the core of different 
mechanisms as our foundation, Reuleaux then instructs his readers to calculate progressive 
stages of motion for a device, with each stage of a cycle being a variation of a central rule of 
motion that unites the devices. In a similar fashion, Wittgenstein seems to apply a similar 
methodological approach to linguistic function, as Wilson notes, when he discusses the 
“development of a rule” in sections 193-94 of the Philosophical Investigations.72 It could be 
appropriate to ask, then, “How does this theorizing relate to the real world?” After all, while one 
could continue a Reuleaux sequence in theory far beyond the limits of the ability of a 
mechanism to function in the real world. To use Wilson’s example, consider a student that, 
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when drafting this sequence, increasing the demands on the machine beyond what would be 
possible in the real world. The student, after reaching the point of calculations that exceed the 
possibilities of the real world simply draws the tangle of lines that would result from pushing the 
theoretical mechanism too far in real life. If judging the student by Reuleaux’s standard, we 
would obviously consider the student to have made a mistake - the calculation could, after all, 
be calculated theoretically even if they far surpass real world possibilities. From Reuleaux’s 
point of view, the student is wrong, even if he is, indeed, correct in “real world” terms. Which, 
then, is correct? Correctness, corresponding to Reuleaux’s model lies in understanding the field 
of possibilities implicit in Wittgenstein and Goethe’s organically based method. Goethe’s Primal 
Plant and Wittgenstein’s language games are tools that allow an investigator to methodically 
diagnose each variation in the development of a phenomenon.  
Whereas the early Wittgenstein believed that these gaps in traditional scientific 
explanation could be overcome by incorporating logic into sorting out linguistic 
misunderstandings and inconsistencies, the later Wittgenstein instead moved to bridging 
scientific gaps through Reuleaux-like models of linguistic activity - language games. The 
Reuleaux models should be seen as a kind of language game corresponding to how to build a 
machine. That is to say, each variation of the model follows the “cities and suburbs” growth 
model of possibilities that seem to anchor our conception of language games in a Goethian, 
organic context and taxonomical tools for understanding the growth of language. These 
language games, it seems, are to act in a kind of linguistically focused Reuleaux-like models 
meant to account for different acting criteria in different situations of use. That is to say that the 
role of language games, it seems, is to account for the seeming inconsistency in terms of 
linguistic correctness in these Reuleaux-like cases, and demonstrate the possible variations of 
	  
 
38	  
each game in different circumstances. To break things down, the case of correctness outlined 
above, there would, in essence, be two standards of correctness that are specific to each similar, 
but still different case – in this case the ideal and the real world. What these pockets of different 
criteria seem to be leading us towards is a kind of differing normativity seemingly analogous to 
Wittgenstein’s language games. Thus, we can see Reuleaux’s essence and Goethe’s notion of 
the Gestalt to be methodologically linked, at least in terms of both system’s use of what seems 
to be common essence, and, perhaps most importantly, the emphasis that both place on 
development and variations of particular phenomena and the overlapping characteristics linking 
them together. The attention paid to these elements allows for an examination of phenomena 
outside of the traditional realm of traditional scientific methods. That is to say, if traditional 
science is engaged in anthologizing and creating systems that explain a narrow portion of the 
external world, the Reuleaxian-method’s overlap with Wittgenstein could prove to be fertile 
grounds for additional, more holistic explanation of events. This explanation, however, can, as 
discussed above, should, for our purposes, be linked to Romantic conceptions of scientific 
explanation.  
 Plants, to Goethe, should not be understood in simple terms of concrete characteristics 
and differences, but as sharing essential components (much like Reuleaux’s essence of 
machines). These archetypical essences should be understood not only in terms of distinguishing 
plants from one another, but - perhaps most importantly - as linking seemingly unrelated plants 
together. Again, to take Reuleaux’s concept of the essence of the machine, Goethe’s attempt to 
understand the Urpflanze was a project rooted in understanding qualities that may not be 
quantifiable, predictable, or static in very developmental terms, terms related by a multiplicity of 
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possible variations that were to be recognized if one were to truly understand phenomena outside 
of the realm of mere prediction and standardization.  
7.0 PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS AND THE TRACTATUS LOGICO-
PHILOSOPHICUS 
7.1 LOGIC AND PERFECTIONISM 
To understand Wittgenstein in Goethian terms, it is necessary to provide an overview of 
his early work. To begin, it is essential to recognize the differences between the two stages of 
Wittgenstein’s life in philosophy: on one hand there is the work of Wittgenstein’s early academic 
career, particularly the logical atomism of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, on the other hand 
we have the ideas of the second half of his career, most prominently associated with the 
posthumously published Philosophical Investigations. The Philosophical Investigations, in 
essence, is a work standing in direct philosophical opposition to the early Wittgenstein’s view of 
language and philosophy originally presented in the Tractatus. These opposing works can be 
viewed as transitional, moving from the strictly descriptive account of language of the Tractatus 
to an account of the characterization of words based upon relational taxonomy derived from use 
and social interaction in the Philosophical Investigations.  
 Wittgenstein’s Tractatus was primarily concerned with demonstrating that “traditional 
philosophy rests on radical misunderstandings within the logic of our language”.73  Among the 
most important ideas that the early Wittgenstein sets forth in the Tractatus is the notion that all 
meaningful sentences are characterized by a precise logical structure that in turn requires logical 
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analysis. Sluga sums things up nicely when he writes “Such analysis, Wittgenstein was 
convinced, would establish that every meaningful sentence is either a truth-functional composite 
of other simpler sentences or an atomic sentence consisting of a concatenation of simple 
names.”74 This, in essence, means that each atomic sentence is a picture of a possible “state of 
affairs” which reflects the same structure as the atomic sentence that depicts the image.75 From 
this, Wittgenstein argued that the world must have a strict and definite logical structure. 
Furthermore, as Wittgenstein writes in the Tractatus, “The world is the totality of facts, not 
things”.76 These facts are chains of simple objects that correspond to the simple names of which 
simple sentences are made of. Thus some traditional subjects - such as ethics, metaphysics, and 
aesthetics -were not only philosophical dead-ends, but, ultimately, unintelligible. Wittgenstein 
writes, “Most of the propositions and questions to be found in philosophical works are not false 
but nonsensical”.77  
 It is with this ideal conception of logic and language in mind that the later Wittgenstein 
should be understood – the later Wittgenstein is reacting against two primary ideas of the 
Tractatus – referentialism and logical perfectionism. Wittgenstein begins the Philosophical 
Investigations with a familiarly rigid and descriptive explanation of language - that of St.  
Augustine.  
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When grown-ups named some object and at the same time turned towards 
it, I perceived this, and I grasped that the thing was signified by the sound 
uttered, since they meant to point it out. This, however, I gathered from 
their gestures, the natural language of all peoples, the language that by 
means of facial expressions and the play of eyes, of the movements of 
limbs and the tone of voice, indicates the affections of the soul when it 
desires, or clings to, or rejects, or recoils from something. In this way, 
little by little, I learnt to understand what things the words, which I heard 
uttered in their respective places in various sentences, signified. And once 
I got my tongue around these signs, I used them to express my wishes. 
While not relying on logical analysis of language as the early Wittgenstein does in the Tractatus, 
Augustine’s account is still intended to conjure an ideally descriptive account of language. 
Philosophers have “often uncritically adopted [referentialist perspectives] in areas which do not 
apply, with the result that philosophical confusion ensues. Wittgenstein points to the writings of 
St. Augustine and to his own Tractatus as examples of this tendency”78 Much like the 
Wittgenstein of the Tractatus, Augustine is providing a linguistic structure that is, for the most 
part, referential.79 Augustine, and indeed the Tractatus as well, are examples of philosophical 
works that presuppose that the role of words is to stand for or refer to objects, and, subsequently, 
that the presumptive role of sentences is to “picture or represent how things stand to each 
other”.80 This referential account of language, the later Wittgenstein argues, is not only primitive, 
but also linguistically one-dimensional. “Augustine does not mention any difference between 
kinds of words. Someone who describes language in this way is, I believe, thinking primarily of 
nouns like ‘table’, ‘chair’, ‘bread’, and of people’s names, and only secondarily of certain actions 
and properties; and of the remaining kinds of words as something that will take care of itself.”81 
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Augustinian referentialism (as well as the somewhat analogous referential tenets of the 
Tractatus), therefore, describes only one of many functions of language. That is, to name objects 
is only one function of language; one that does not take into account the various other aspects of 
meaning or communicative purpose. Wittgenstein argues that ostensive training like that which 
Augustine is referring to “can be said to establish an associative connection between word and 
thing.” This, by itself, is nothing outside of the scope of reason. Wittgenstein, however, 
continues, attempting to isolate the purpose of the word – that is, its intended use:  “But what 
does this mean? Well, it may mean various things; but one very likely thinks first of all that a 
picture of the object comes before the child’s mind when it hears the word. But now, if this does 
happen – is it the purpose of the word? – Yes, it may by the purpose.”82 In the quoted passage, 
word “may” is the key to understanding the later Wittgenstein’s critique of referentialism. That is 
to say, the words may - and most likely do - in fact, have different purposes other than that of 
conjuring a universal image. There are many different ways to use - and therefore understand - 
words, such as the teaching of words, speaking commands, etc. Thus we see a radical shift from 
merely describing possible states of affairs, as is the case in the Tractatus, to focusing on the 
variety of acceptable uses inherent within words - uses that go far beyond simple description.  
 More so than just assaulting traditional, referential presumptions as to the nature of words 
and naming, the later Wittgenstein also attacks one of the Tractatus’ most influential tenets - the 
notion of logical perfectionism. Wittgenstein abandoned the idea that meaningful sentences must 
have a precise logical structure that corresponded to the logical structure of facts illustrated by 
sentences. As noted earlier, the Tractatus assumes that there is a perfectly ordered, fixed logical 
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structure of language - and rules of language - that underlie all meaningful statements.  Yet in the 
Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein moves away from this line of thinking.  
The more closely we examine actual language, the greater becomes the 
conflict between it and our requirement. (for the crystalline purity of logic 
was, or course, not something I had discovered: it was a requirement.) The 
conflict becomes intolerable; the requirement is now in danger of 
becoming vacuous. – We have got on to slippery ice where there is no 
friction, and so, in a certain sense, the conditions are ideal; but also, just 
because of that, we are unable to walk. We want to walk: so we need 
friction. Back to the rough ground!83  
 In the next section Wittgenstein adds, “We see that what we call ‘proposition’, 
‘language’, has not the formal unity that I imagined,84 but is a family of structures more or less 
akin to one another…The preconception of crystalline purity can only be removed by turning our 
inquiry around.”85 To treat the logic that underlies language as ideal in the manner presented 
above is, the later Wittgenstein argues, to “sublime the logic of our language.”86 Indeed, 
Wittgenstein uses the words “this” and “that” as examples of the confusion that such sublimation 
produces. The word “this” used as a name in ostensive explanation or naming does not have a 
fixed meaning – “If you don’t want to create confusion, then it is best not to say that these words 
name anything. – Yet, strange to say, the word ‘this’ has been called the real name; so that 
anything else we call a name was only an inexact, approximate sense.”87 
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7.2  TURNING OUR OWN INQUIRY AROUND: CHANGING OUR PERSPECTIVE 
AS TO THE PURPOSE AND PROPER FUNCTION OF LANGUAGE GAMES 
 Here a very serious question arises. That is to say, if the later Wittgenstein believes that 
his early work, and indeed much of body of traditional philosophy, has been focused on the 
wrong things, namely defining or generalizing words, concepts, and meanings, and that we 
should instead focus on understanding our language in terms of the affinities and differences that 
are highlighted by language games, then it is of the utmost importance that we reach a firm 
understanding as to (1) what exactly constitutes a language game, and (2) how exactly these 
games work to somehow make up the entirety of language as Wittgenstein appears to claim. In 
other words, at this point we understand that Wittgenstein believes that we need to change our 
approach when trying to understand these concepts. Additionally, he provides us with a term 
(language games) that Wittgenstein believes to be the correct method by which to understand 
language and ideas, as well as a variety of examples to demonstrate what he means when he uses 
this term. Wittgenstein does not, however, provide the reader with anything near a working 
definition of the term, even in the most general sense. Perhaps most importantly, Wittgenstein 
does not explicitly outline how these games - if they are indeed meant to be the structure of 
language – actually work. We are left with questions that require specifics as to the function, 
form, and relations between these language games that mirror the questions about propositions 
and meaning that Wittgenstein believes language games to solve. These questions, I will argue, 
could be solved if were to take into account, on one hand, Wittgenstein’s attitude towards 
traditional science, and, on the other, its possible link with Goethe’s scientific views. The 
project, then, is to understand what Wittgenstein is doing by linking his language game 
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methodology to one that is similar – Goethe’s own scientific work. Goethe’s work with plants 
diagnoses similar problems within scientific method, towards, albeit, different phenomena.  
While Wittgenstein does, in fact, address the complaint that he does not seriously define 
language games, he does not specifically answer this object in a manner other than arguing that 
games are meant to demonstrate that “phenomena have no one thing in common in virtue of 
which we use the same word for all – but there are many different kinds of affinity.” To put it 
simply, there are major ambiguities present in Wittgenstein’s language games; we have been 
given a tool, shown a few instances of its use, but not given explicit instructions as to its specific 
form or function. This summons a feeling of discomfort in the reader (which is perhaps one of 
Wittgenstein’s intended functions of language games). Specifically, we have a general 
understanding of language games, and, though Wittgenstein warns us against attempting to 
understand language and philosophy in terms of fixed definitions, we require some sort of 
definite grounding to truly understand language games as more than a cluster of simplified 
languages or general actions (such as lying or teaching), which are normal, non-stereotypical 
activities categorized by Wittgenstein as “games.”  
 I have given a brief overview of the schism between Wittgenstein’s early work – as 
exemplified by the Tractatus, and the ideas that characterized his later career, most notably those 
expounded upon within the Philosophical Investigations. In short, the Philosophical 
Investigations provides readers an alternative route to take when solving the problems that 
Wittgenstein eventually encountered resulting from the Tractatus in the years following its 
publication. While we could simply resign ourselves to understanding language games as a basic, 
indeterminately defined tool that highlights certain inconsistencies in language through relational 
clustering, Wittgenstein (as demonstrated throughout the cited passages above) uses language 
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games as fundamental elements of philosophical inquiry. What this requires, then, is an attempt 
to understand the methodology that Wittgenstein in employing in his later philosophy. Much in 
the same way that the later Wittgenstein asks us to turn our inquiry around, it is necessary to turn 
our own inquiry into Wittgenstein around. In order to understand language games, we must, 
therefore, attempt to understand them in terms of their methodology and possible intellectual 
origins rather than focus our attention on their exact definition or strict place within 
Wittgenstein’s philosophical framework. It will be through an attempt to understand the 
methodology behind language games, I believe, that we will not only get a better picture of a 
working definition for language games, but also gain a much clearer insight into what they are 
being used to advocate for within Wittgenstein’s later philosophy than would be gained by 
further study of their specific mentions within the Philosophical Investigations. Thus it should be 
our new objective, after turning our inquiry around, to investigate where these language games 
originate – which, if we are to take the influence of Romanticism in Wittgenstein’s work 
seriously, would lead us to using language games as a philosophical tool from which a common 
understanding of meaning develops. In other words, if we can’t get a clear answer from 
Wittgenstein, then we must trace back the roots of the methodological ideas that underlie 
language games in an attempt to base possible answers to our questions in those who have not 
only influenced Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, but also have perhaps provided clearer 
explanations of methodology and intended result. Our inquiry, then, is not just one relating to the 
philosophy of language, but one that is grounded within the history and philosophy of science.  
8.0 CONCLUSION 
 To understand language games in terms of their function and classification within the 
Philosophical Investigations, tracing a route back to a source of possible methodological and 
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scientific-ideological influence is perhaps the most necessary step in deciphering what has been a 
primary point of debate within Wittgenstein interpretation. Language games, it seems, are used 
within the Philosophical Investigations to catalyze a shift in perspective from one that places a 
strict emphasis on definitions and concretely-defined uses of words towards one of 
understanding words and usage in relation to not only actual cases of behavior, but also in terms 
of the differences between similar, but distinct, cases of use. Defining language games and their 
exact purpose – much like defining actual words and their correct uses – is, I would argue, in line 
with their use within Wittgenstein’s writings. To understand the purpose of language games, it 
has been helpful to look at Goethe’s work as a kind of methodological proxy, one that, if 
analyzed, would seem to shed light on Wittgenstein’s original intent.  
 Goethe’s scientific method, I have argued, grew out of frustrations analogous to those of 
the later Wittgenstein, frustrations rooted in a scientific dissonance rooted in the mechanistic 
explanations of the world, as well as feelings that the static systems of scientific inquiry were 
overlooking large parts of phenomena in favor of standardized procedure, predicable output, and 
easily replicated results. Our ability to understand language games in Wittgenstein’s writings is 
not only augmented by acknowledging Wittgenstein and Goethe’s commonly held complaints 
regarding traditional scientific explanations and explanatory systems, but also amplified by 
understanding the ways in which Goethe and, I have argued, Wittgenstein, understood 
phenomena to be related. That is to say, if Goethe and Wittgenstein are linked in terms of their 
understanding of science and similar methods for engaging in explanation, then it would follow 
that their conclusions should share similar traits. To put it bluntly, if this link can be established, 
and Goethe’s writings hold a level of clarity unable to be found in Wittgenstein’s, then we 
should be able to find some of our answers relating to Wittgenstein in Goethe. I have attempted 
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to establish this link between these two thinkers using the scientific ideas of Wittgenstein 
outlined by Wilson to contribute to an area of Wittgensteinian interpretation that, while 
undoubtedly important, is all too often reluctant to turn its own enquiry around.  
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